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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
HAL MCKEE,
PlaintifffAppellant,
Case No. 20050598
RENN SMITH,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO CONTINUE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.
A.

APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD THE
CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.

In Brief of Appellee, the Appellee argues that the court did not err in denying the
Appellant's motion to amend his Complaint to include a claim under a boundary by
acquiescence doctrine since the plain language of the Complaint did not set forth such a
claim and the trial court correctly determined that the land belonged to Appellee. Brief of
Appellee at p. 8.

Appellee fails to sufficiently support their arguments under the

particulars of the "boundary by acquiescence" doctrine and mistakenly believes the trial
court's ultimate determination supports its prior decision not to allow Appellant to amend

his Complaint. The trial court's ultimate determination, however, was made without the
claim of "boundary by acquiescence" being considered and, thus, cannot be determinative
of it.
"For purposes of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, to "acquiesce" means
to recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the
owner's property from the adjacent landowner's property." RHN Corp. v. VeibelL 2004
UT 60, f24, 96 P.3d 935. "Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party
attempting to establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish
that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties." Id, citing
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^[18, 44 P.3d 781.

"Acquiescence is a 'highly fact-

dependent question' [citation omitted], and 'acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit
and inferred from evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line
may evidence the landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the
demarcation between the properties." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined as follows:
A plaintiff is required, under our liberal standard of notice pleading, to
"submit a short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief and a "demand for judgment for the relief." UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)(2). The plaintiff must only give the defendant "fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved."
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Canfield v. Lavton Citv, 2005 UT 60,1114, 122 P.3d 622, citing Williams v. State Farm
Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966,971 (Utah 1982). Further, "[t]he rule is designed to provide notice
of the nature of the claims asserted against a defendant and an opportunity to meet those
claims." See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982), Cowlev v.
Porter. 2005 UT 518, U36, 127 P.3d 1224.
The Utah Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of the liberalized pleading rules
when it stated, "the fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford
parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining
to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their adversary have 'fair notice of
the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved.'" Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Center. Inc. 2005 UT App
325, U2, 122 P.3d 891, citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah
1982), (citations omitted). As a result, "these principles are applied with great liberality in
sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative
defense." Id
In the matter of Blackham v. Snelgrove. 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the function of pleadings, stating as follows:
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving,
issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and
inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before
trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new
rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving
3

and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the
preparation for trial.
. . .Thus, it can very often be found stated in these cases that a complaint is
required only to '* * *give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved.' It may also frequently be found stated in these cases
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless '* * *it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of
facts which could be proved in support of the claim.'
At trial and in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant argued that paragraphs five (5)
and six (6) of his Complaint gave adequate fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds
of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved to Appellee that the
fence that had been in existence for a substantially long period of time was the agreed
upon boundary between the properties, and that Appellee was encroaching on the
Appellant's property. Counsel for the Appellee stated at the hearing that he had no notice
of the theory. However, in the discovery served upon the Appellee on January 14, 2004,
and Appellant's Initial Disclosures, which were served upon the Appellee on May 4,
2004, responses and witnesses were listed indicating Appellant's position with respect to
this issue, and showing supporting evidence of the nature of the claim.

Appellant

concedes that he did not use the language "boundary of acquiescence" in his pleading, but
the language used in the pleadings and discovery process clearly provided the fair notice
of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
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litigation. See, Zoumadakis at 1J2. Notification and evidence respecting all particularities
of a claim under boundary by acquiescence were provided. See, RHNCorp. supra.
As stated above, the rules that govern the filing of pleadings are liberally construed
to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have
pertaining to their dispute." See.Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., supra. Appellant was
denied the privilege of presenting his legitimate contentions to the trial court pertaining
to his dispute with the defendant in this matter. The trial court effectively revoked this
privilege by denying Appellant his request to amend his Complaint to include the words
"boundary by acquiescence" as a defined term for his already-stated claim. By so
denying Appellant's request, it was clear that the trial court did not intend to render a
determination based upon this doctrine, somehow believing that the already-stated claim
was plead under a different claim.
The trial court erred in concluding that Appellant's claims were not plead under
the "boundary by acquiescence" doctrine. Further, having done so, the trial court denied
Appellant the right to amend the pleading with a defined term that was typically utilized
in conjunction with the claims already set forth. Appellant's pleadings gave the Appellee
fair notice of the grounds against him and notified him of the type of litigation that was
involved. Even though his pleadings did not use the exact language "boundary of
acquiescence," he met the requirements needed to inform the Appellee of his claims,
grounds and the litigation against him. Appellee would not have suffered any prejudice
5

by the amendment since defendant's attorney was well notified and had prepared a
defense accordingly to the witnesses and evidence presented by Appellant.
B.

Appellant was Prejudiced by not being Allowed to Amend his Pleadings

"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend pleadings 'shall be
freely given' by the court 'when justice so requires.'" Savage v. Utah Youth Village.
2004 UT 102 K9, 104 P.3d 1242, citing Johnson v. Brinkerhoff 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d
1132, 1136 (1936). "The court's ultimate goal is to have the 'real controversy between the
parties presented, their rights determined, and the cause decided.'" Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed what provides ample support to deny a
motion to amend, and has determined that simple prejudice is not enough. In Kasco
Services Corp. v. Bensoa the Utah Supreme Court indicated that a motion to amend
should be denied only where 'the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by
having an issue adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare." 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah
1992) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court's insistence
that the nonmoving party suffer "unavoidable prejudice" to justify a denial of a motion to
amend is well-established in Utah law. See, e.g., Fishbaugh v. Utah Power and Light a
Div. ofPacificorp. 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998), Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1389
(Utah 1996). This is based on the principle that the parties should not be forced to litigate
issues for which they had little time to respond. See, Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178,
1183 (Utah 1993)(noting that "[a] prime consideration in determining whether an
6

amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party
to meet the newly raised matter" {quoting Lewis v. Moultree.627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah
1981))); Chenev v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (noting that
"[w]hat [parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required."). Thus, in order to justify
the denial of a motion to amend on grounds of prejudice, the prejudice "must be undue or
substantial prejudice, since almost every amendment of a pleading will result in some
'practical prejudice' to the opposing party. Mere inconvenience to the opposing party is
not grounds to deny a motion to amend." 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 776 (2003)
(emphasis added). "[T]he fact that an amended pleading may require the defendant to
conduct additional discovery does not, alone, constitute sufficient grounds to justify the
denial of a motion to amend. In determining whether the amendment will cause prejudice,
the court's inquiry should center on whether the nonmoving party has a fair opportunity to
litigate the new issue." Id at § 777.
As stated supra, Appellee would not have suffered any unavoidable prejudice by
the amendment since defendant's attorney was well notified and had prepared a defense
accordingly to the witnesses and evidence presented by Appellant. Appellee in this
matter had sufficient notice that Appellant was making a "boundary of acquiescence"
claim since he had plead the elements and provided evidential support for it throughout
the discovery and disclosures.

All necessary documents had been provided to the
7

Appellee long before trial. Appellee had plenty of time to prepare to meet the boundary
by acquiescence claim at trial. Allowing Appellant to amend his pleadings to include the
specific wording "boundary of acquiescence" would not have resulted in any prejudice to
Appellee, since Appellee already had plenty notice of this claim.
The trial court prejudiced Appellant by not allowing him to amend his pleadings to
include the boundary by acquiescence claim.

The claim was plead in the original

pleadings in theory, it was just not specifically defined under this terminology. Pleadings
are governed by liberalized rules and Appellant should have been allowed to amend his
pleadings to include the correct terminology. By denying the Appellant the opportunity
to amend his pleadings, Appellant was prejudiced in that the trial court may have
misconstrued his claim as something other than "boundary by acquiescence." Had
Appellant been able to amend his pleadings, it is likely the trial court would have granted
him relief under the doctrine and he would have been granted access to use land that is
rightfully his and has been for many years.
II.

APPELLANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
A BOUNDARY OF ACQUIESCENCE.

"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are 1) occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, 3) for a period of time, 4) by adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen. 917
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). In Englert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165, 169, (Utah App. 1993),
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The Utah Supreme Court defined a boundary line by acquiescence as "...open to
observation." Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah 1966). A boundary line "must
be definite, certain and not speculative." Id.
In Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794, (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the reason for the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence when it
stated as follows:
"[t]he very reason for being of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or
agreement is that in the interest of preserving the peace and good order of
society the quietly resting bones of the past, which no one seems to have
been troubled or complained about for a long period of years, should not be
unearthed for the purpose of stirring up controversy, but should be left in
their repose. Arising out of this reason for being, an indispensable
requirement for application of the doctrine is the existence of the boundary
for a long period of time, which the actual decisions in all of our cases on
the subject affirm."
In the instant matter the Appellant has provided sufficient evidence to prove that
the boundary line of the property was established by acquiescence. Many people testified
as to the existence of the fence and the length of time it had been in existence. Ms. Sarah
Simmons testified that she was 82 years old and that the fence line was had been the
boundary line between the properties before she was a child. Tr. at. pp. 22-29. Farrell
Bobby Simmons, the son of Sarah Simmons, testified that the fence line had been the
boundary. Tr. at pp. 31-34. Appellant testified that there was a marker with the fence
line and that he had been told by his father as a child that it was the boundary of the
property. Tr. at. P. 55.
9

Appellant presented sufficient evidence and testimony to establish the property
line by "boundary by acquiescence." Appellant also established the necessary elements
needed for a "boundary by acquiescence." First, the property line was visually marked.
A fence ranrightdown the line for many years. There is no dispute that a fence existed in
the middle of the two properties and it was visible to everyone. Several different people
gave testimony at trial that it was their knowledge that the fence was the boundary of the
property and that they were not aware of any other boundary line.
Second, there had been mutual acquiescence to the fence being the property
boundary line years before Appellee owned the property. In the case of Johnson v.
Sessions. 25 Utah 2d 133,477 P.2d 788, (Utah 1970) "the trial court found a boundary by
acquiescence in that a fence was erected by the then owners of the lots some 21 years
prior to the commencement of this litigation." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision. Based upon this holding, Appellee's acquired ownership of the property
does not extinguish the fence as the property line. The fence as the property boundary
line had been established for years before the Appellee even received the property. There
had been mutual acquiescence to the fence being the property boundary line for years
before this litigation.

Appellant testified that he had owned one piece of property

adjoining the Appellee's land for fifteen (15) years and another piece for six (6) years
after purchasing it back from his brother. Tr. at p. 54. Mrs. Simmons testified that
Appellee had owned his property for approximately 14 years. Tr. at p. 31. As the fence
10

had been in place foi som z time prior to either "the Appellant's or Appellee's ownership of
the adjacent lands, the property line had been established by mutual acquiescence prior to
the ownership of either party in this matter.
testified to bi I"1 ft: s Simmons, the fence had been in place since
before her birth and at the time of trial she was 82 years old. This establishes that the
fence had been the boundary line for quite some time and through several different
landowner

is apparent that the (vm \ li hi h . n .ii.fiiii.l bi .1
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was. The landowners had established the fence as the boundary line, which was not
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adjoining Appellee's had any kind of discrepancy with the boundary line of the property
being the fence line. Therefore, Appellant established the fourth element.
If the trial court had allowed an amendment to conform to the evidence in this
matter, it is clear that Appellant would have succeeded in his claim of "boundary by
acquiescence." Even in light of the denial of the motion to amend, Appellant solicited

sufficient evidence at trial to allow this Court to make the determination as to the facts of
this matter. Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his
motion to amend the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's order and remand with direction to the trial court to allow
Appellant to amend his Complaint so as to have a proper trial on the claims contained
therein.
DATED this

day of April, 2006.

Cindy Barton-Coombs
Attorney for Hal McKee
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